Kevin Ulriich's Anchorage Capital is returning money to investors in its flagship hedge fund. They will be focusing on their structured credit/CLO business with $18bn and $4bn private-equity style lock-up fund
似乎需要投资者的流动性，差的回报和大量缩小的债务机会。乌尔里希也可能会退后一步。
According to @hominem
锚地回报：
2015：1.2％
2016：2.0％
2017: 7.8%
2018: 0.7%
2019: -1.4%
According to WSJ,
2021: $18.5%
Another thread here:
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Comments (35）
Bump. Interested to hear people's views on the future of distressed investing in this low interest rate environment and insane amount of liquidity.
it's very challenging obviously. presumably things will change eventually, but until then distressed funds have to find other things to do (mandate permitting)
When do you see things changing? Seems like rescue financing/stressed recoveries are going to take up more of the capital at work compared to traditional Ch.11 - do you think that will change or is the distressed opportunity going away permanently?
Stellar CLO shop
I wonder, do people actually rank/give a shit about CLO managers and who is better/worse? I've never seen any ranking on CLO shop performance/prestige and they all gather AUM like weeds regardless
I don't know about "prestige" and who cares, but CLO/CDOmanagers definitely被市场排名/卖方。
Dispersion on equity returns can be between 8-20% depending on the manager. So yeah, clearly there is skill involved in both asset selection and liability management.
I'm assuming you work at a hedge fund and this is the kind of attitude prevalent in that group, unaware of how unattractive their product is to LPs. This gives some clue as to why LPs think vanilla liquid creditHFs为6-8％的ITD净类型收益收取1％/15％的收益是无知的。有一个直接贷款（8-10％），私人MEZZ（10-15％），CLO权益（8-20％）或Clo Mezz（8-10％）的全部菜单，可供选择以进行信用 /替代收益分配。这些选项中的大多数都比典型的公共苦恼/特殊情况更加敏锐得多这些数字HFthat see -15-30% types of drawdowns in a dislocation.
You realize CLO equity is just super levered leveraged loan risk right? Same with CLO and private mezz to a lesser degree. You can talk about sharpe ratios being better but we've been in a 10 year low利率debt binge where the downsides on default ratios haven't been tested. If you run into a true rough patch where drawdowns in those "clueless" distressedHFsare down 15-30%, your CLO equity/mezz might be worthless when default rates spike and you own a bunch of trash loans that were waved in because most CLO money is based on deployment speed and isn't that discerning (obviously not true across the board).
他们一直通过GFC和Covid——这个测试is why CLO asset class growth had a step function growth as allocators realized that you actually can safely put 10x leverage on senior loans if the liability structure doesn't include mark-to-market triggers and have long-dated term structure.
Sure - your statement that some CLO equities can become worthless in a downturn just reinforces my point that manager skill matters to performance. Your comment that "if distressed funds are down 15-30%, CLO equity must be even more worthless" doesn't really have a logical basis. CLOs are strictly governed by their diversification and ratings requirement that inherently make the portfolios much higher quality and resilient than a typical distressed book.
另外，您真的没有说什么可以支持苦恼的资金为一笔良好的投资提供的方式。从您的论点说，关闭是杠杆车辆而不是辨别的，从逻辑上讲，以某种方式感到困扰是一种更具吸引力的替代品。因此，让我这样说 - 假设两个宇宙中的平均基金在经济低迷中都有严重的亲周期风险，那些苦恼的基金在良好的市场中会产生一致的12-15％回报（因为关闭是因为关闭）？
我看到的问题是结构性的变化and semi permanent personally. The forced selling, info/complexity advantage, lack of liquidity, etc. that made the market work 15 years ago just doesn't exist in the size needed to meet the current capital focused on the space anymore. There's an ongoing supply/demand imbalance IMO -- there will always be flash moments of feast (March 2020) but I see them coming and going very quickly.
3月kets became too efficient for liquid distressed, you need to have some private vehicles and ability to go deep into the business to make money in distressed these days.
做you think SVPstrategy of private origination and long term control equity rather than forced selling is the way forwards or are the companies in Ch.11 just too unattractive?
They've been able to make good money -阿波罗也有done good money making deals with distressed business and holding on to them. Some other DistressedPEfunds are making去od money, it appears to be the sweet spot to be in. But what do I know I am no wizard.
I'm based in Australia and saw their Sydney office closed in 19/20 or sth. These guys love debt-equity conversion strategy when it comes to Aussie distressed market. Given rate environment, yeah, probably very challenging to find opportunities in these space.
Array
imagine being paid a million dollars plus and you cant even beat inflation... what a joke. Would rather hire a wall streets bet redditor to manage my money.
创始人的性侵犯指控无济于事
借用。虽然我绝对同意该策略的结构性挑战的讨论，但许多受苦的人的观点（包括乌尔里希的同行，即$ 5B+ sm hfs的负责人）是，关闭旗舰基金是（在几个中，方式，不仅是以上）特殊的情况。
My boss said this as well. Otherwise it makes zero sense to shut a fund down after a massive banner year returning almost 20%. Of all years lol...
What is really amazing is that, during the depths of the covid crisis, not a single well-known airline, cruise ship operator, hotel operator, toll road operator or shipping company went bust. Theactions of the FED/ECBallowed businesses that should have gone bust to tap the markets and stay alive. This presented some interesting opportunities (Carnvial 1st liens that came at 11.5%, IPT was 13%, and priced at 99 which ended up trading in the 5-6% area a few months later after vaccines were announced) but the only real restructurings were Hertz and Europcar. If you were a classic distressed fund, covid should have been a dream come true but in reality it just never happened. The unwillingness of central banks to allow companies to fail just makes this strategy much more challenging today.
People who boughtthese carnival bonds了一笔——知道一群人买了them in syndication and sold them a year later at 110cents, basically a 20% gain on a year. But agree, there is too much liquidity, the only companies who fail are truly bad companies and often had legacy issues pre-COVID.
It's a benefit of a company being too big to fail, and they become like that by hiring lots of employees. Governments allowed lots of small businesses to fail last year, but not the big firms because they had lots of employees (and lobbying power). In a way, the same thing happened with banks in 2008.
Adapt or die
Surprised there's no news on layoffs.... almost interviewed here a year ago and glad a former employee convinced me otherwise
What did they say?
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